SmartTranscript of House Judiciary - 2025-03-11 - 3:00 PM

[Chair Martin LaLonde]: Still, taking test according to h three forty two. I'm gonna be changing the the order of the witnesses somewhat. I definitely wanna get the, folks that are gonna talk to us about the Vermont, point of view, first, and then we have a couple people give us kind of a national sense of things, and and we're gonna end with them because I wanna make sure we we understand the need, if any, from the point of view of the affected covered individuals. And we'll start with Department of State's attorneys. Over to you. Great. [Kim McManus]: I was worried I was gonna lose my stomach because I can't. Hey. For the record, my name is Kim McManus. I'm with the Department of State's attorneys and sheriffs. A heavy topic for today. To jump off of some of the questions that I heard earlier, will this bill eliminate threats to prosecutors? No. Could it help minimize threats and violence, potential violence to our prosecutors through minimizing the utilization of finding our private information online? Very possibly. I am not a data broker. I do not understand data brokering. It's such a verb. I don't know exactly how our information gets online or how it circulates, so I cannot speak to that. What I can speak to is that our prosecutors and our employees at all the various state's attorneys' offices receive threats. We receive threats fairly regularly. As you all know, we have at any given time right now, approximately twenty three thousand cases. It would not surprise you that cases involving family disputes, domestic violence, and a number of the serious felony cases are the ones that we generally, generate threats towards our prosecutors or towards our staff. We receive a variety of threats, ranging from death threats to individual attorneys or to offices in general. These threats can be made by phone, in person, in writing. As far as the variety of threats, threats of physical and or sexual violence, threats to property, like posting of prosecutors' personal vehicle, and where that vehicle parks and making, public aware of that, to deal with that information and sort of what they will. So when these threats rise to the level of criminal cases, which was noted earlier, we do have criminal statutes that would cover when these threats leak over and become criminal threatening, stalking, or if actual physical violence is done. There is a criminal component to address this. Our understanding of this bill is how do we minimize the personal information, my home address, my personal cell phone number from being online and easily accessible? That's our understanding of the bill. And if that is what the bill aims to do, either minimize or eliminate our personal information online, we support that. We understand as public servants that the public has a certain amount of access to us. We understand that they may be able to find us at our office in Redport, but what we would very much like is for them not to be able to come to our homes. Of course, as noted, Vermont is a small area. I can tell you my neighbors right now probably do not know what I do. I don't think they watch your YouTube channel. My apologies. No. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: That is shocking because [Thomas Burditt]: our viewership is up. And [Kim McManus]: and, you know, I may or may not share it with them. But to the point that was being made earlier, yes, your neighbors may very well know, you know, that a judge lives down the road or that state's attorney so and so lives next door. But our average defendant has to look for that information, whether it's asking around town or going online. Again, if we can minimize that information getting into the wrong hands, we support that. Just to give you a little perspective and excuse me. Can I grab one of these? Yes. They're they're for you. Oh, thank you. I was hoping I wasn't stealing your work. We often like to report our numbers to you. One area that we are not happy to be distinguished in is that we are more than likely one of the highest referrals to the Building and Grounds Safety and Security Office. We would highly encourage you if you would like more information about threats to state employees to reach out to Building and Grounds. And I believe they would have a lot of the hard data that you might be looking for. But what I can tell you occurs that if a credible threat comes in, building and grounds is involved. And as noted earlier, the office is looked at. They run through what the with the attorney or the employee who's been threatened, they run through what the emergency plans are in the office, what your escape plans are, where the security buzzers are that you can buzz, whether or not more cameras need to be added. In Bennington County, we just recently added, I don't know if they're all new, but currently in the state house building in Bennington, where our state's attorney is located, there's a total of forty six security cameras, and a number of those were added because of repeated threats to Bennington state's attorney individually and the office. There so there's a comprehensive view of your workplace. And then, you have, wonderful individuals who really know, their their stuff, about keeping yourself secure, come and meet with you at your home. When I was a prosecutor, I had one threat. Now we get a lot of threats. We get a lot of people who are not happy with us. Not all of them rise to the level of credible. I had a threat made to me, or a threat was made about me, in when an inmate was incarcerated. DOC felt that it was a credible threat. It was very specific as to what this person wanted to do to me, when they wanted to get out. It was very graphic, very violent. And so I had the unfortunate experience, which a lot of our prosecutors have, sitting in my home, having them assess your home and talk about things like trimming back your bushes and putting up security cameras outside. They make a diagram of your home and send it to the local police department, so that the local police department knows sort of your entrances and egresses. They discuss where your this was the thing that really stuck out to me, where your ALMO is, which is your place of glass stand. If you can't leave your home, where would you go to hide and wait for police to arrive, and how long will it take for police to get there? And they give you a I think it was a twenty page document all about this information and how far away your local police department is, how long you need to essentially stay alive until somebody can get to you. It is a sort of otherworldly experience to talk through that. At the time, I lived in a two bedroom condominium with hollow four doors. Like, I do not have an Alamo. I don't quite understand. You know? But they talk through, like, okay. Well, here's what you would do. And they go as far as to talk about, having certain medical kits in your home or in your car. So if you are injured, again, you can do what you can to self, protect yourself again until emergency services come. The other element that they take on, and we will get to the privacy piece in a moment, but I just think this is really important to understand that this does happen, to prosecutors and other state employees. They talk about your car. They talk about identifying your car. I was fortunate. I had a green Subaru Outback at the time, like, essentially anonymous in the state of Vermont. But they talk about parking your car at work, parking your car at home. The idea of being cognizant of somebody following your car and what to do and how to sort of lose someone or get to a fire department or a police department. Lastly, in this massive report that they put together, they look at your online presence, and they see what's already available online, and they discuss, you know, what you can do as an individual, about that. So things like social media, how you can protect that. I had everything set to the most private settings, and they very quickly were like, oh, this organization is important to you. You spend a lot of time here. You spend a lot of time here, which was mind boggling. And, again, not what this bill would protect, but just important, to note. So all of those sites quickly shut down, wanted nothing to do with them. But they then talk about, you know, whether your home address is available, your Social Security number, your birth date, your telephone numbers, and what sites they're available on. Now my understanding and, again, it's been a few years since I had to do this. There are various private companies that you can pay to go on and essentially try to scrub your information from the Internet, and then that needs to be an ongoing process. Again, my understanding of this bill is that you would have a mechanism to ask data brokers to not distribute or redistribute our information. So either if we've already taken it down and it's popped up again, we don't have to continuously be monitoring our information online. So to whatever measure this bill can, in the words of the bill, cease disclosure or redisclosure and lower our private information from being shared. Again, we understand it will not eliminate it completely. And this bill, I don't think purports to do that, but in any way that it can minimize where we are exposed online, we support this bill. The one thing we would ask you to consider is currently in the definition of covered persons, it only mentions prosecutors. Our victim advocates, paralegals, our front office, everyone's at I believe I called everybody there. Yes. They are all, equally susceptible to threats. During the time when I was a DV prosecutor, I had one credible threat where I had to go through this process. My victim advocate during that same time period easily had three, that had to be done. We had multiple visits to her home to go through the same conversation. And so we would encourage you to look at who is being covered, and to expand that to our entire staff. And the municipal employee, that does not cover us. So just to to make that for you all. Happy to take any questions. Questions. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Just one, Ken. Do you have [Zachary Harvey]: a sense of what the universe of covered persons would look like? I mean, granted, I mean, specific to the state's attorney's office just because, like, I mean, through your testimony, the way that I'm thinking about it is, like, there are far more people that this would impact than initially, you know, we would even think about in the bill itself. So do you have a sense of how big that universe is? [Kim McManus]: I don't. I I heard your point earlier of, you know, sort of anyone can be threatened. I think this bill is directing that just because we've decided to do certain jobs doesn't mean we should be our personal intention [Zachary Harvey]: is to be able to I totally agree with that. I think that for myself too even as, you know, an elected official. [Kim McManus]: The one group that I did notice, along with our staff, judges are listed, court staff. I would be interested, and maybe the judiciary will bring that up. I mean, anyone who's worked in a courtroom [Angela Arsenault]: Mhmm. [Kim McManus]: Or been out in the hall, court staff received a number of threats and probably want to be included as well. [Zachary Harvey]: But do you think it would be in the thousands, tens of thousands of people? [Kim McManus]: Oh, goodness. Well, I would not think so, only because it's Vermont. So, like, our [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. That's fine. [Kim McManus]: Office alone, you know, we'd be including [Tom Oliver]: Couple hundred. [Kim McManus]: Hundred and seventy [Speaker 6 ]: Yeah. That's what I think. [Kim McManus]: A little bit more. I would need to ask Annie real quick to Yeah. No. No. I'm just [Zachary Harvey]: I'm just kinda curious if to get my [Kim McManus]: Yeah. So I mean [Zachary Harvey]: universe. [Kim McManus]: Altogether of all those covered persons, we you know, I'm sure we hit [Tom Oliver]: Thousands. [Kim McManus]: Thousand. Yeah. [Tom Oliver]: But I [Kim McManus]: don't think we're talking another digit. [Angela Arsenault]: Okay. Thank you. I wouldn't. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. Tim, I just wanna [Thomas Burditt]: thank you for sharing your experience with us. I think it it's very helpful to hear, what it actually means when someone is targeted. And, it's helpful for us when we're considering the meaning behind this bill and whether it's necessary or not. And the only question I had was the I think getting the data would be really helpful. Is the buildings and grounds data capturing, like, when someone comes to your when they come into your home, they do the explanation? Thanks to [Kim McManus]: I believe so. I wasn't able to get that before this, but I believe that's you know, they would connect, you know, what their process is. Yeah. You know, again, they and and it's a wonderful service that is done for state employees that they provide that. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. Really appreciate, your testimony. So, judge Zuni, we'll go to you when I see you're online, if you're with us. [Thomas Zonay]: We are. Good afternoon. Tom Zohne, chief superior judge. So I I think it's gonna come as no surprise that this is a policy decision for the legislature. [Tom Oliver]: It [Angela Arsenault]: Thanks for coming in, judge. [Thomas Zonay]: It it's a policy decision that certainly could have significant impact on the courts in terms of the number of cases. Listening to the prior witness, I it certainly appears as though this is something that could add to the courts, but the question then comes down to, well, is it something that's necessary in the event that it does? And we get back to the policy decision there. I I have to comment. I see John Muffler on the screen and, mister Muffler in two thousand eight was someone who I got to first meet at the National Judicial College in Reno. And he was there still working for the United States marshal service, and he was talking about security. Subsequently, I became faculty, and I got to see John's mister Muffler speak a number of times. And it always struck me that, well, you know, Vermont's different, and we talk about that because he he would talk about how you have to you should take a different route home and giving all these tips for security, and we would think, well, jeez. I there's only one way to get there from here. We can't do those things. And I think that there's a complacency that we can often have with security. And I representative Harvey was asking some very good questions about, well, peep we're in Vermont. People can find out where you are. It's pretty simple. True. Last threat we had was someone from Connecticut on February nineteenth, threatening to come up and do harm to a number of people. Could they have found out things online? And I say that because the issue of security is one that I'll let mister Muffler and others talk about in-depth. But from from the judge's perspective, we can tell ourselves, well, they're gonna be able to find me if they want. But the question I have is, why would we make it any easier for them to do that? The individuals who are going to look at doing harm, certainly, some of them may have the rationality to go to the town clerk and look up where you live. I suggest that oftentimes many of many of them do not have that rationality. Daniel's law was built upon, the death of judge the killing of judge Salas' son. That individual was not rational, and he came from out of state. And so I point these out as when we look at Vermont and say, well, it hasn't happened here. I think we have to add the word yet. And, hopefully, we add the words, and it never does. This type of bill is something that seems as though it takes a step towards protection of covered persons, judges, and others. I I know that there are many reasons why people would look at judges and say, well, we wanna go after this judge. Well, law enforcement, state's attorneys, others have those concerns too, and we certainly support the idea that public employees should not be threatened. I checked with our security, head, Rob Schell today, and he indicated that in twenty twenty three twenty twenty four, we had two hundred and over two hundred and fifty threats. He believes about half of them would be including with judges and comments made or threats to judges. There's been increased contact with judges according to Rob and and as I well know from my colleagues, and that contact is through home mail cell phones or telephone calls and so their information is out there and people are getting it and the internet as rob points out is being used to locate communicate and engage with judges in ways that hadn't happened before. And so this type of bill is something that does it stop that from happening for sure? I believe the experts talk about that. I think the answer is no. But can it minimize it and can it potentially prevent it? It would certainly seem that, that would be a benefit. The judges, who have previously contacted me about this type of situation, are aware of companies called DeleteMe and other companies who will go out and do things that will try to assist here. And I know there is support for the idea that anything we can do to increase the safety for the judicial officers as well as, again, the other individuals who are state employees, who are public servants. We certainly would support that. I would have one technical note and that is on page four line twenty under the definition of judge I would change it to say judge means any justice judge, or magistrate of a state court located in Vermont and then say and any judge or magistrate of a federal court. I think having this Vermont superior the Supreme Court superior court or judicial bureau raises questions as to whether assistant or probate judges will be covered, and it should be more encompassing if that is the intent. I'm certainly happy to address any questions. [Zachary Harvey]: Judge, thank you as always. I just have one question, and it kinda goes back to the definition of data broker. And in you know, and you brought up a very pointed point in terms of, you know, individuals savvy enough to go to town clerks and look up grand lists and look up addresses that way. Would we be considering you know, because, like, I think of, you know, where I live, all, you know, the grand list and everything is, you know, readily available unless and your name is associated with it, unless you have it protected through whether trusts or LLCs. Would we consider town municipalities, data brokers under this definition? [Thomas Zonay]: I haven't studied that definition enough to be able to give an opinion on that. [Zachary Harvey]: Okay. I think it's it's something I'm curious about. That's it. That's all I got? [Speaker 6 ]: Yeah. Just write that question down later then. [Zachary Harvey]: Because I do think, chair, that the definition is the the scan scope is so broad and that we could really apply Data Broker to anything at this point. Is a municipality could they potentially face litigation? Okay. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Tom Oliver and then Angela. [Tom Oliver]: Good afternoon, Jeff. Mhmm. My I'm reading the bill quickly here. It it it seems it has written that it would have to take some type of proactive work on the individual's part to make sure that they were not being outed by this information. And if you don't know that, how would it protect you? I mean, we you would have to go back and have it shrunk and then take action if they didn't do so. Correct? [Thomas Zonay]: If I understand your quest question correctly, yes. I believe you're correct that the judge would have to take action. [Tom Oliver]: K. [Thomas Zonay]: So I don't know the covered persons. [Tom Oliver]: Yes. Exactly. Okay. Perfect. So if if if you didn't know where the source was, it could be uncovered. So unless you're out there doing research all the time, trying to find out where your main name might be popping up, is it gonna help you? Not necessarily. [Thomas Zonay]: I actually asked someone who I know who is an expert in this field that very same question yesterday. [Tom Oliver]: Okay. [Thomas Zonay]: And I will I'll let the experts, mister Muffler and others, talk about that because I think, they can enlighten the committee that, yes, it it it does seem as though you'd have to know about it, but there are ways that you are able to do that if I understand correctly from the individual I spoke with. [Tom Oliver]: Right. I mean, I tried dodging one of your server process service once there for for a long time, I think. They finally found me at my home. I don't think they use the Internet. And as a protected individual myself, I I I I'm not so much worried about data brokers. I worry more about DMV information, things like that. If if someone is permitted enough to find you, I think they're gonna find you. I think that's credible for everybody to say. I guess if you have to do if they're willing to redact information in the sensitive area, I would feel a lot better, but just BMP. You know, you can submit a request and you will you get somebody's address. If it were redacted, I would feel better. But to worry about I I I just never heard of anybody around here having you to find somebody. That's all. I I I just want to see those statistics. No question. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Break it up a little bit, Tom, but I think we got the point. Angela? I [Ian Goodnow]: well, it's more a comment than a question. Or well, I'm just I'm trying to [Chair Martin LaLonde]: into a question by saying, are you free or It's a bug. Right? [Angela Arsenault]: Right. Yeah. [Thomas Burditt]: Am I correct? [Speaker 6 ]: Is it correct? [Ian Goodnow]: Yeah. Well, I'm I'm looking at the definition of data broker, and it seems pretty specific to you know, it's a it's a business or units of a business that no one elects and sells or licenses to third parties. And only when they you know, the information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship. I I think of Town Clerk has we could it's not one of those. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So so without without getting you don't need to get into that debate because that is for commerce to figure out. [Kim McManus]: Okay. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: They need to figure out the scope of Data Broker. We can say, please make sure that this isn't too broad. But but, I mean, it's it's like [Ian Goodnow]: Well, I think missing from this argument might be what's something that might be a little might be helpful is for us to really understand how inform what data brokers do and how the information that we're trying that this bill aims to protect gets to the Internet. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So so I'm trying to understand, like, arbitrage attorneys, local courts. If if this is something that can minimize the access to that kind of personal information, they're a thumbs up there. That's all I want to really understand. Because if we go down that road, let's take another week of testimony. Is because because that really from what I understand, even from talking to Rick, is that really you can slide into some pretty technical stuff that really is out of our ValleyWick. So so disagree that I mean, yeah, yes. But that's not really a question for us to answer. Right. I mean, I'm I'm taking it at really this high level. I've heard enough to say, this will help, this will limit or minimize the ability of people to get addresses of these people we're trying to protect. That's about the extent of of what I need to know for at least the part of the job that we're doing, which is to find out if if that's helpful, if that's something people want. [Kim McManus]: Okay. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: That makes sense? That's Yeah. Because otherwise, they're gonna be another couple days. [Ian Goodnow]: Yeah. Okay. I just don't know that everyone understands how. And so [Kim McManus]: you might not know if, but you [Ian Goodnow]: don't know how. That's my concern. But But [Chair Martin LaLonde]: I think I I'm just taking that the that it it is going to help. I take that that that that's from from from Matt, and and I understand from that that that's that this will help. And so Okay. And and if it doesn't, well, then they shouldn't do anything with it when we take it down the the hall. [Thomas Burditt]: Yes, Ian. That's actually, I think, like, kinda how I'm structuring it in my head is, like, if doing this with data brokers will reduce these risks, then, yeah, totally support. And if commerce does the work on the data brokers and finds that it doesn't, then yeah. But, like, I think if all we're doing here is saying, if it would, if that's what it would do, right, then Right. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: I'm trying to to evaluate the threats that we're trying to address and and and get the the opinion of the covered persons that that we deal with. And we've heard from one who says, no. It's not gonna do anything. If we've all heard from two that that if it does something, great. We we could use that help. That's what I'm hearing. So we'll go to the next covered person. So so let's jump to sergeant Mike O'Neil. Is if you could join us, thanks thanks for being here, sergeant. If you could join us and identify yourself for the record, then you [Tom Oliver]: Good afternoon. Hey. My name [Speaker 6 ]: is Mike O'Neil. I'm actually a retired sergeant for the Vermont State Police for twenty eight years, and I'm now the executive director of the Troopters Association. I've been working for them now for about seven years. I typed up some testimony, and a lot of the comments I've heard, I think what you're really gonna hear from me is, yes. We support this, but I'll go through it. I don't understand debt of brokering. It's a great question. I hope that a bill like this could have the effect the the the effect we're hoping for. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and testify in support of each three forty two, legislation that takes an essential step towards safeguarding Vermont's public servants, including members of the Vermont Tribes Association, for threats, harassment, and violence enabled by the disclosure of their personal information. Every day, Vermont's law enforcement, judges, prosecutors, and other public servants, and I think their list would be quite lengthy when we really look at all of them, place themselves in risk in order to fill fulfill their duties to the communities they serve. Unfortunately, in the digital age, their exposure to threats extends far beyond physical encounters. The unregulated access and distribution of personal information by data brokers pose a severe and growing danger to these individuals and their families, which is very important to always remember and the impact that this has on families of people that are just doing their job. This bill provides a necessary measure of protection by requiring data brokers to cease disclosing the protected personal information of per public servants upon request. The role of law enforcement inherently inherently involves engaging with individuals who may have criminal intent, violent histories, or grievance against the justice system. In recent years, we have witnessed an alarming increase in targeted harassment and even physical attacks against officers and their families due to the personal information being readily available online. This is not a hypothetical risk. This is a present danger that we feel must be addressed. By allowing public servants to remove their personal information from public databases, This bill acknowledges that privacy, safety, and security of those who enforce and uphold the law are fundamental to the continued function of our justice system and government operations. H three forty two does not impede the public's right to transparency or accountability in government operations. Instead, it strikes a necessary balance, ensuring that the personal address and contact details of public servants are not used as tools to intimidate or instill violence against people for doing their job. The negligible public value of the personal information is far outweighed by the risks and associate the risks associated with accessibility. The ability of officers to perform their duties without undue fear for their personal safety is essential, not only in not only for their well-being, but also for the effective enforcement of Vermont's laws. Ensuring that they can do their jobs without undue concern for their safety and families fosters a more stable and resilient law enforcement community. For these reasons, we support this legislation and urge this committee to try to move this forward. And I know you're late in the session here and time may be difficult. So I hope that's possible. Appreciate that. Questions for the retired side? [Chair Martin LaLonde]: I guess that was it. Thank you. [Angela Arsenault]: Yeah. I appreciate that. I appreciate it. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: If you could submit your written testimony as well. Yeah. I mean, that's great. That I appreciate [Tom Oliver]: it. Helpful. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Oh, Tom has [Kim McManus]: a question. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Oh, Tom. Sorry. Tom, go ahead. [Tom Oliver]: Yeah. I always forget me. Yeah. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. I I didn't see you. [Tom Oliver]: Thanks, sergeant. I have just one quick question. And my question would be, you know, I I hear you. I understand your concerns for the same reason. My question is, upon request, to me, is a day late and a dollar short if you didn't know. And that's the weakness I see in the bill, like, upon request. If you didn't know somebody had your information or gave it away, the bailouts are short. Your thoughts on that? [Speaker 6 ]: Yes. I understand. I guess my response would be that if this legislation is passed, I believe most people covered would make that request. Whether or not the information is already out there, you don't know. But at least if there's a starting point going forward, you can make the request. At least you can feel safer that a new situation isn't going to give somebody the ability to easily get your information or at least that would be the hope. [Tom Oliver]: But who who do we make that request to? I guess, it's all for [Speaker 6 ]: me. I wish I knew the answer to that. It was my understanding of how this legislation would work, and I had no idea. [Tom Oliver]: Okay. Thank you. Appreciate it. You're welcome. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: And I think that that that part, again, commerce will certainly dig into the actual machinations of how this thing would work. So thank you very much. Thank you. So we're gonna jump over to the chief, now chief, Pont Briand. Did I pronounce that even close to right? And I apologize if I didn't. [Chief James Pontbriand]: Close enough. Pont Briand. No. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: I thought that's what I said. Alright. Over to you if you can identify yourself for the record and proceed. Thank you. [Chief James Pontbriand]: Certainly. My name is James Ponpriand. I'm the chief of police here in Berlin. I'm also representing the executive board of the Vermont Chiefs of Police. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Alright. If you could proceed. [Chief James Pontbriand]: Certainly. Very interested in this legislation. As chief, I kind of accept a higher level of accessibility and notoriety just in the function of my position. My concern would be for my line officers and having their information unduly exposed to bad actors. My concern with this legislation is there's already a process in place for people to have their information scrubbed if they're proactive. What it doesn't seem to address is nondata broker types, special interest groups that might be keen on distributing an officer's information, particularly when they're involved in a controversial issue such as an officer involved shooting. There certainly have been many cases of an officer's information, their address, their personal data, their picture, family information being distributed on the Internet with the intent of people camping out in front of that officer's home and making their life miserable. I would like to see legislation address that with people distributing information with the specific intent of causing intimidation or fear for that individual. [Angela Arsenault]: Dave, can you repeat that? [Chief James Pontbriand]: Yeah. I I would like to see the legislation address non data brokers who distribute an officer's information, law enforcement information, with the intent for that officer to be intimidated or harassed in some manner. [Angela Arsenault]: Right. [Speaker 6 ]: There are [Chief James Pontbriand]: a lot of special interest groups out there that operation oversight, for example, continuously picture post people's pictures, all the information they get about their employment, where they're employed, all that other stuff, on the Internet, I can only assume with the intent that this officer face a higher level of scrutiny for whatever reason. [Angela Arsenault]: Right. Yeah. Right. It just warms my mind that that could get into a freedom of speech. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. I I mean, that's not this bill, I don't think. I but I can I can see that we can we can dig into that further as an extension of what we're trying to do here? This this does this has taken, I think, a smaller step than what you just have suggested. And I guess, question for you is, at least with respect to the data brokers, it's is that something you could see potentially well, forget who it is, data brokers, whatever. The higher level, if we make it harder for somebody to get the address information and phone number information of law enforcement, Is that beneficial given the threats that you see to law enforcement? [Chief James Pontbriand]: Anything we can do to limit that information would be beneficial. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: And this doesn't go far enough, I'm understanding, from your perspective on that, and that's certainly something that we can continue to look at as well. [Chief James Pontbriand]: And I don't believe it does. And I do understand freedom of speech, but when it crosses the line with the intent some kind of malicious intent, I think that's problematic. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Right. There's the true threat doctrine that we'd have to look a little deeper at and see, you know and that's something we can work a little bit more with state's attorneys as well who have dealt with that a little bit as well as certain people at the attorney general's office that we dealt with this particular question in the past on how far we can go in this kind of scenario. Apparently, this bill doesn't cross the line. At least one court in New Jersey has said. Similar bill has not. But we have to dig a little deeper at what you're talking about, I think. [Chief James Pontbriand]: Thank you. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. No. I appreciate it. Any questions for for the chief? I don't see any questions. I appreciate your time. Thank you thank you for being patient, and and and we we will look you know, I will make a point, you know, it won't happen this session because we only have three days four days left in the session. But but I'll I'll make a note to to dig into that a little bit further and and maybe reaching out to you again on that as well. [Chief James Pontbriand]: Thank you. And thank you for the invitation. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yep. Thank you. Alright. So we're gonna back up to John Muffler next. If you could join us on mute and identify yourself for the record. [John Muffler]: Hey. Good afternoon. Thanks for the invitation. My name is John Muffler. I'm a consultant. My company is Equitas Global Security. I'm retired from United States marshal service where I oversaw the National Center for Judicial Security. And I currently am a senior adviser for Gavin De Becker and Associates, advising clients on anti assassination strategies and assessment and management of situations that might pose a hazard to their safety or well-being. I've been with Gavin about nine years. I had about twenty five years with the US Marshals Service, and I was specifically charged with assessing and protecting threats to our judiciary, court family, prosecutors. I find myself in a very unique position few years past retirement from the marshal service, conducting a lot of presentations and training nationally. I don't know how far you want me to get into my background at all. I can stop right there and get into some notes. It's up to you what you want me to [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. Why don't why don't you proceed with, talk a little bit about the situation and what this bill could do to to address the situation? [John Muffler]: Yeah. So I think, what we're seeing, I think, I think many states have legislation already on the books as you're kinda saying, but in particular to a Daniels law or some version of that, it's less than half the states have that. Obviously, they're moving forward with it. And I think one of the things with, the privacy law or the PII, personally identifiable information, which is what you're trying to protect for for, certain government officials. There are two reasons why sensitive information should be hard to obtain. Potential attackers may never learn it. Right? They may give up, and they may they may pursue someone else. And the research bears that out, whether it's Secret Service data, FBI, or the marshal service. And the other thing is the more difficult it is to obtain, the better chance of being detected in the process. And what I mean by that is, and I've heard a lot just in the in the short time we've been on for thirty eight minutes about, what's it, credible threats and etcetera, those kind of terms. You have to understand that, you know, the the more you the more hurdles you put up, whether it's a whether it's this legislation or great locks lights and windows of your house, the better. I've heard also a couple times people say, if they're willing to get me, they're gonna get me. Well, that's parochial thinking, and that'll just help them immensely succeed in carrying out that attack. And that's why legislation like this and a host of other things that Robin Moranti can talk about too is part of a full, security system apparatus. Right? There's so many things in play. But the PII legislation that you're talking about is number one. That is where judicial pursuers, public figure pursuers, those who are pursuing law enforcement and victims of domestic violence all go to those weak spots, which is social media and the Internet. And so that's that's just currency for attackers, and that is where the mitigation needs to occur. And it begins with passage of legislation. And the other part of that too is, you know, every state's doing it differently, whether it's DeleteMe or Atlas privacy or Ironwall three sixty. You need another apparatus to scrub the Internet. This piece you're talking about will be punitive, and it'll be important. Right? Because it's gonna slow down those data brokers if not gonna stop them. You gotta remember, they you could you could fill out information to for these data brokers because you have a legitimate threat or or a threat of some sort. They can still post your family's data. Right? And so you're going through all this trouble, but they can still find your kids. So I think, again, the the legislation needs to address all of that. And, you know, there are other experts out there, that are you know, it's beyond my high bandwidth to explain some of the specificities of these laws, but certainly those CEOs of the companies I just mentioned could give you some some horror stories on that. So, I think the legislation you're looking at is is critical. I mean, it's critically important. I will just say this. Let me just kinda talk a bit a little bit about research and and why this is important. And this might be a little mind blowing because it's counterintuitive. I've heard the word credible threat a couple times. I know a judge in Austin, Texas. She received a threat, from the boyfriend from the girlfriend of an individual who had a case before a judge, that person. [Tom Oliver]: That that [John Muffler]: person's girlfriend called the DA investigator and said my boyfriend gave the boyfriend's name is going to kill the judge in his case. Well, there's only one judge in that case, and that was the judge that was killed a week later. But the DA investigator blew off that threat as not credible. So the thing about a credible threat is interesting. Right? And so, when you look at the data, and this is a John Mather making stuff up, this is this is secret service data, this is marshal service data, you know, it if it's counterintuitive. So if you receive a direct threat, you are less likely to be attacked by that person. But if you receive an inappropriate communication, which might be covered on the first amendment, right, you're more likely to be attacked by that person. Again, this the research bears that out. So any threat, any inappropriate communication needs to be investigated, and it's not part of this legislation you're talking about. I'm just getting on a little bit of a soapbox right here, because it's important to recognize all of that behavior because all of that that that benign behavior can lead to threat behavior. And a lot of times it does. So it's interesting that Vermont collected two hundred and fifty threats. A half of that went to judges. And, you know, I'm hoping that every one of those was investigated by someone. There was an interview of some sort and a report made. Because it's important to you know, you gotta collect the dots. Half the states don't even collect the dots, because then if you don't collect them, you can't connect them. Right? And so all of that is very important as part of an overall apparatus in threat assessment, and I think that's a big miss, nationwide. So, you know, I just you know, I'm yeah. I'm on a little bit of a soapbox, but I think, what you're doing is commendable, and I hope this legislation goes forward. But there are just some things other things to be aware of, beyond, you know, credible, etcetera. So, keep keep that in mind. Let me just repeat those two things I mentioned earlier. Two reasons why sensitive information should be hard to obtain. They may never learn it. Right? They may give up. And the more difficult is to obtain it, the better chance of being detected. And so that is the piece that is critical for those people who are being protected by this legislation and those who have a fear of being stopped and intimidated, whether it's the law enforcement on this, call or the judges here also or even the legislature. So, those things have to be kept in mind, and you have to train yourself a little bit, you know, situational awareness, what fits, why is that person in my neighborhood, etcetera. Because we see that behavior carried out. It's a pathway of violence that we talked about. The research bears that out too, that pathway behavior. And so we're talking about again, I'm I'm just going back to my notes I took about that pathway behavior. If you have somebody that's savvy enough to go to the town clerks, right, now to look for your stuff or send you mail or your you have information over your cell phone. In warning behavior typology, that's known as a fixated pursuer. That's problematic. Right? That's somebody who is far down that pathway and likely closer to an attack. And so this is where the legislation becomes an inhibitor. It stops that person from finding that information. But all of that going to the town clerk, getting mailed home, and receiving phone calls, especially to your cell phone, if it's your personal cell phone, not your government, that is very problematic. And that may not rise to the level of, say, an arrest. But in a mitigation strategy for law enforcement, that needs to be looked at. That's fixated, problematic pursuer behavior that is leading to an attack. So so it all matters. Everything you're doing matters. And clearly, this legislation is critical from stopping that person from continuing down that pathway. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Great. Good questions. Angela? [Ian Goodnow]: I have a question. Thank you so much for your testimony. I'm reminded as you're talking, I'm reminded of a training we received here in this room about what to do if there is an intruder in the building, most likely an active shooter. And we were told to shut the door and then basically pile everything up in front of the door that we can to impede that person's progress into the room or potential progress into the room. And I'm I'm thinking of that as, is that a fair analogy that this legislation like this, is is one of those impediments potentially for for someone who can get this to to do something. [John Muffler]: Potentially, it could be because, obviously, you want to get the person to not come to that room. Right? And that that behavior is identified early on. Just think of a school attacker. You want that behavior to be identified early on and assessed early on so you can mitigate any mitigate that behavior, whether it's a Baker Act or an arrest or some other, process. So, you know, you stop them before they get there. Now, again, there's one cons there's one constant with what you do. You go to work every day. Everybody knows where you work. So, I would hope that there's proper protocols in place if there's an active threat in the workplace. Right? And I, you know, I would agree with the barricade piece. Obviously, if you can get behind barricades and and and make that more difficult, you know, because that person in that person's mind, it's it's a body count, for the most part, unless he's got a specific person he's looking for, he or she's looking for, but mostly it's he. So, you know, you'd want to slow that person down any way possible. And so barricading, obviously, is one example of it. Let's take let's let's go back a couple steps. If you if that person is of record, if he's one of the two hundred and fifty people that your office has, you know, identified, let's get into mitigation. Let's get into a threat assessment. Let's get into some mitigation strategy. Maybe that person needs mental health crisis intervention. So they're that whole other step of it. You know what I'm saying? But, obviously, if they're already there and they're already coming in, then those are things that are you know, there's left of bang, which I'm talking about over here, which is to my right. I should say it like this way. But and then right of bang is what you're doing to prepare when it happens. Right? And so that's all part of that complete security enterprise that you have to have. [Kim McManus]: So Right. [Ian Goodnow]: And I guess to be clear, I was I was you know, you're not saying will that potentially address the person who might actually show up, but is it fair to think of this legislation as one of those things you put in the way? [Tom Oliver]: Yeah. [John Muffler]: Yeah. One hundred percent. [Ian Goodnow]: Because we are here. [Kim McManus]: Like, it's it may not be the it may not everything, but it's one of those things that [Ian Goodnow]: we can do to help prevent [Kim McManus]: from following through on a on a threat. [John Muffler]: That's right. That's a that's a hundred percent right. [Kim McManus]: Thank [Chair Martin LaLonde]: you. Any other questions? I Tom, Oliver. [Tom Oliver]: There you go. Thank you. So in your assessment of this legislation, do you think it's tough enough as far as protecting people just being legislation, or do we need to make it harder to get people's information? Or or I I don't know if you can do that, but what's your thought? [John Muffler]: Me? [Tom Oliver]: Yeah. [John Muffler]: Yeah. I think, if your if your legislation can mirror New Jersey's as close as possible, then you're you're in a good way. I do really think that is the standard. And other states have copied that. I haven't gotten too into the weeds on your legislation, but I know, you know, Robin's getting ready to, you know, come on. But if you as close as you can get to that legislation, I think it's a home run. I know Delaware copied it. Maryland tried to some version of it. And so, you know, I think that is the standard. You know? And I you know, obviously, that only came to be because her pursuer, Judge Salas' pursuer, attacker, you know, killed her son. [Tom Oliver]: Yeah. [John Muffler]: You know, unfortunately, got, you know, terrible. But hopefully, this never happens in Vermont. So but I think if you can copy that legislation, I know every state's gonna be different and, you know, there's there's lots of things in play there. But as close as you can get to that [Tom Oliver]: Again, I go back to the the fact that the that the person whose information today has to be preempted to make sure it doesn't get out. And if you don't do that, you're gonna be a fix. So I'm Yeah. And and I and I think that's gonna be very off oftentimes the case. I mean, not too many people are gonna go, I don't have the time to sit there. You know, I've shut down my three credit bureaus so nobody could steal my you know, get credit cards in my name, things like that. But I don't I don't know how expensive would it be to have to remove yourself proactive from Internet or whatever other point. [John Muffler]: Yeah. I think there's some personal choice here, but I think there's things that, you know, you know, perhaps government can step in and and do some things too beyond the legislative piece. Right? I can tell you personally, I I had I I purchased, you know, a couple of these programs, and, you know, they work pretty well for me. But, certainly, you need multiple things in play. You don't just need one tool. If you only have one tool in your toolbox and it's this legislation, it's not gonna work. Right? Because, you know, look at Judge Wilkinson in Maryland. You know, even if they had that legislation passed before he was killed in his driveway, that was home. So that was a that was a domestic no. I'm sorry. That was a divorce case. He followed him home. Right? Right. So, but you need all these different things. You need to have a toolbox full of tools. Right? Whether it's a home security system, a dog, you know, not advertising, how many stormtroopers, kids you have on the stickers in the back of your window, advertised parking spot. You know, these are things that Robin does daily and is was working on. And there's so many little hurdles, like I said. You have to make it a little more difficult for them. But if they cannot find your information so easily, it's a massive, massive roadblock, and that's great. That's what we [Tom Oliver]: can do. Would you be one of the people that has the statistics or that'd be probably? [John Muffler]: I'm there's tons of the statistics, but [Tom Oliver]: I well, I'm I'm just curious if there's any any national statistics of which data folders may have given over information. So if someone was found that there was an office, then Well, [John Muffler]: I can tell you that, and I can go over I mean, there's just there's just countless stories with public figures, judges, legislators. [Tom Oliver]: I mean, the homicide. I I don't need the stories. I've been tracked. I mean, I've been found at home by people. I'm talking actually committing the homicide. [John Muffler]: Yeah. I'm looking at the research that I was part of with the National Judicial College. Over ninety percent of judges in this country support this kind of legislation. Ninety point two. So That's [Tom Oliver]: that's not what I'm looking for. I'm looking to find out how [John Muffler]: you're looking for. Yeah. Alright. [Tom Oliver]: One of [John Muffler]: the things you're gonna find it difficult is that kind of research, that kind of data. But it's out there. I mean, there's there's certainly thousands of anecdotal stories that I can probably be giving you off the top of my head Right. How the attack was successful because the information was so easy. Again, information is currency for these attackers, and that's where we [Tom Oliver]: look at it. Thank you. [John Muffler]: Yeah. No problem. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Other questions for for the whole plan? Alright. Not seeing it. Before we go to you, Robin, I I was going to, go to captain Barnes, next. So if you join us, captain, I didn't notice you're sitting in the corner there, so I I just [Thomas Burditt]: kind of avoid the sun. [Zachary Harvey]: It's the first time in [Ashley Barnes]: a long time. It was actually warm. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So you identify yourself for the record and proceed. [Ashley Barnes]: Ashley Barnes. I'm the, special investigations captain for the Vermont State Police. It's kind of a it's an odd title. People don't usually know what it is. It means they oversee the Vermont Intelligence Center, arson explosions unit, and the Vermont Drug Task Force. Okay. So luckily for you, I'd say ninety percent of what I was gonna talk about has been thoroughly covered. Michael Neal spoke representing the Vermont Troopers Association, the the union. And so from the rest of the Vermont State Police, we would, of course, support this bill. For those of you who don't know, lieutenants and above are not part of the union. So I'm gonna try not to repeat what was already said. But from, like, a personal standpoint, like, I certainly have had death threats and other threats. And as as law enforcement, we know the risk. Right? We get threats at the barracks all the time, email, voice mail. It's part of the job. When you receive information by somebody who lives far from your community that has your address, that lists your children's names, where they go to school, it hits it hits home. It's very different. These are not people that are following us home from the barracks. In the instance that I can think of, the majority were found online. In one case, not with, like, a South Burlington officer, his information was found online, and his address was spent put on the Facebook for other people to harass him. In my case, you know, I I received received a few threats that listed where I lived, and and my family threatened my life. So it's highly impactful on us, but we, in some ways, maybe sign up for it. Our families don't. Our kids don't. Our spouses don't. And they're equally, if not more, impacted by that. So I think that this is only one step in many ways we can protect ourself, which is already had spoken of. But it will help cut that down immensely. And, of course, being the state police when there are threats to judges, other law enforcement, DCF, which I've experienced a lot. I feel like they get a lot of this, specific to their homes and their addresses. We investigate it. So I can say without giving stats that the information obtained online is significant, and it's not always the we're following you home or we're going to your office. One thing I would like to see added under law enforcement is, like, our victim services coordinator who deal with all the same individuals. Our victim advocates, our embedded mental health workers, they're just as easily targeted as well. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So the embedded We have a [Ashley Barnes]: they're called embedded mental health or maybe they're mental health crisis workers now. They're in addition to our victim services unit. They they fall under a different under a different side of the house. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Questions for Kathy? We've covered a lot, so appreciate that. Yeah. [Ashley Barnes]: If I go in last, maybe has its benefits for festival. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Thank you very much. [Ashley Barnes]: Alright. Thank you. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Thank you. Alright. Well, to Robin Morante. Did I pronounce that right? The nearest [Robin Morante]: You're you're close enough, sir. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Well, I'm never close enough. Go ahead and identify yourself for the record, and then I'll know how to pronounce the name. [Robin Morante]: Alright. Good afternoon, everyone. I'm I'm Robin Marante. I'm the chief of court and judicial security here in sunny New Jersey. After receiving Vermont's invitation to appear today, I thought maybe this body might benefit from, like, a little bit of a glimpse into New Jersey's overall judicial security journey, if you will. I've had the privilege to work with, you know, the judiciary here since leaving law enforcement in December in of twenty thirteen. Chief justice Stuart Rabner and director Glenn Grant had the foresight to create court and judicial security internally here in the judiciary as a unit in that year, and that was to address the increase in volume and severity of the threats that New Jersey was seeing. And under their leadership, they challenged me to assist them in creating an overall culture of security at that time. So this bar predates, you know, the tragic incident for judge Salas, you know, security and and threats against the judiciary there. As John Muffler says, and I appreciate the shout out. I've had the privilege of working with John a a few times, and and he's very astute. I would say to you that, you know, again, these aren't new. And prior to that, ultimately, that and it did lead to Daniel's Law in New Jersey. But New Jersey was moving incrementally forward towards a more secure environment for judges and court staff overall knowing that the National Center because I heard people talk about statistics. They are they have climbed significantly. Those statistics over over open source. I can tell you I review upwards of three thousand reports a year here in New Jersey. Prior again to those events, again, we are moving incrementally. We launched an online platform that centralized all security related reporting statewide, municipal through supreme, because we we understood that those reports would allow us to begin to collect intelligence so that we might risk assess and predict possible threats and problems. Because there's there's there's a real, I think, sometimes, intelligence gap in some of the states that do not have that centralized reporting. The real time reporting platform along with a twenty four seven hotline, threat hotline, allows Portland's Judicial Security to coordinate with our law enforcement partners in a comprehensive way to meet the security needs immediately upon receipt of that report or that hotline call. In twenty fifteen, I, along with some external partners from the United States marshal service and Somerset County Sheriff's Office, created a task forcing program that relates to judicial security, whereby we it never stops here, my friends. And that program was a partnership between the United States Marshals Service, the New Jersey State Police, all twenty one county sheriffs in my unit, to address security concerns statewide, and it's called JSMART, the Judiciary Security Management response team. And that program is pivotal in New Jersey, and it allows for the judiciary and our executive branch partners in those agencies to work together to, again, address threats against judges and staff. And through that partnership, we can begin to create training for judges and staff and law enforcement that bolstered our, you know, overall response to incidents. But fast forward to July twenty twenty, New Jersey was witness to this tragic event at Esther judge Esther Salas' home and the the passing of Daniel. And the tireless advocacy that she did, putting judicial security on the map, understanding that this was not a circumstance that was abating in New Jersey or nationally. And for information privacy for judges everywhere, she was advocating for that, and and I stand by her advocacy of that. I think Daniel's law is an essential first step to enhancing security for judges without question. And I think many judges throughout New Jersey opt into the Daniels Law program in New Jersey by accessing their online portal in which the executive branch partners at the office of information privacy administer that here. And that program allows for the redaction of information for law enforcement judges, other protected individuals to be pulled out of governmental sites and that, you know, specific to executive and legislative branch. PII is bought and sold. There was a lot of discussion about data brokering. And anecdotally, I will tell you the example that I use with my judges when when we're, you know, advocating for them is that, you know, especially during COVID, I don't think there's a soul out there anymore that doesn't have an Amazon Prime account. Right? And whether you realize it or not, Amazon Prime or just your plain old Amazon account is a form of social media because you get to leave reviews. You have a wish list. You are able to interact with others, and they buy and sell your information fifty times over. And it is definitely a challenge, but I think it is a a worthwhile challenge. And the metaphor, of the active shooter barricade door, I think, really does hold up. Right? I I get exactly where you're going, and I I I agree that that that metaphor is apropos in this circumstance. And even though it feels like when PII is bought and sold at the rate that it is on the Internet, it's an astounding rate, and it's creating, like, this weird hamster wheel of information maintenance, and it's very daunting for anyone. But, again, it doesn't mean that it's not a worthwhile pursuit because some security is better than none. And recognizing in the wake of the tragedy and the passing of Daniel's law, I think we in New Jersey knew that we could do more and we could do even better. And the chief justice and administrative director here charged court and judicial security and our partners to build upon what we were already doing, comprehensive programs for security. And it's important to recognize that I think security can be very personal to folks. And because any security that's deployed comes with a potential cost or inconvenience, one size doesn't always fit all. Right? I think it's important. And and John spoke a little bit to, like, you know, just the singular component of information privacy is really not fully sufficient. It's an excellent first step, and I I wish all states would take it. But there is, I think, a lot more to do. And understanding that, again, led us to create a number of other proactive programs for our judges to engage in. We've trained and certified approximately two hundred law enforcement officers statewide to do residential security surveys to help judges, you know, target harden or other threatened persons target harden their homes. And, again, we certify them. They have to do a practical, all of that. In partnership with our IT division, the judiciary built a judicial protection profile where judges can enter sensitive information in the event they fall victim to a critical incident, and our law enforcement partners have to deploy quickly and safeguard their families and children. We manage, you know, event security. And perhaps most significantly, I think Jay Smart created an an, ultimately, New Jersey passed additional legislation in January twenty twenty two, and that statute allows a law enforcement officer to apply for a protective order on behalf of a judge whereby they have found themselves victim of a crime. You know, we have a a lot of folks here that do get charged by New Jersey State Police who investigate threats to superior court judges in this state whereby, you know, whether it's a terroristic threat or a harassment or other indictable, our sheriffs who are in charge of protection can now apply, work with my office, and submit an application or a petition for a protection order that also allows for, you know, the removal of the ability to acquire weapons and the forfeiture of weapons if that individual does have, you know, a permit to purchase carrier, what have you, in New Jersey. So, again, I would I would credit the leadership here in New Jersey, and I wanna thank the state of Vermont for the invitation to address your body today. I think most important takeaway, though, is that true security comes from continuous commitment and innovation and consistency and cooperation and coordination between the three branches of government. Obviously, I'm sitting here with you guys. So the success of Daniel's Law in New Jersey and any future legislation, I think that speaks to the security of the courts is a direct reflection of that intergovernmental partnership. And so I would thank you for the invitation. If I can answer any questions, certainly, I'm happy to. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. Tell me. Yeah. [Angela Arsenault]: Thank you for your testimony. So before Daniel's law [Kim McManus]: Mhmm. [Angela Arsenault]: And and and I'm talking about just the people that are protected in Daniel's law, how many how many threats were there against those people again, before the law, and how many threats are against those people now? [Robin Morante]: So I can't speak to Daniel's Law in New Jersey does cover law enforcement, and I don't track those statistics per se. I can tell you that before Daniel's law, we were still getting upwards of two thousand JIRS reports a year. We are now up over three thousand. But I think it's important to know, and I I would suggest to the body that Daniel's law in and of itself is not necessarily a deterrent, and I think there needs to be it makes it more difficult for folks to get that personal information so that they can act out directly towards the judge. But there is a difference, and and John started to allude to it. There's there's security issues, and then there's criminal ones. And sometimes when we can have something that is is really small and on its face where maybe law enforcement has no ability to charge or there's no first amendment issue or anything, as John was alluding to, an inappropriate communication. But when you look at a pattern of behavior and you see a number a number of those inappropriate communications, while not chargeable, could represent a huge security concern. And we see a lot of that in New Jersey where it's not right for a criminal charge necessarily, but it creates an environment. Because statistically, also, as John was saying, the person that's jumping up and down saying they're gonna kill you is not usually the one that actually does so. So [Angela Arsenault]: I'm just I'm just a little confused. Before before Daniel's law, there was two thousand, and then people's information was was protected, and and it jumped by fifty percent. [Robin Morante]: Well, what I'm gonna say [Angela Arsenault]: that to make them on face value, to me, it shows it's not working. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: No. Can I [John Muffler]: just jump in? Sorry. [Robin Morante]: I would be happy, John. Go ahead. [Kim McManus]: I would Yeah. [Tom Oliver]: I think I think [John Muffler]: the law has nothing to do with somebody's behavior. Right? It's not gonna ever it's not a roadblock. So and it's not going to it may per the only thing the law is going to do is preclude somebody from finding that person, hopefully. Right? It's not ever going to stop somebody from sending out a tweet and a thousand more people jumping on that tweet in agreement that, you know, I don't like this person, this this legislator, this judge. So it's the law that law a law will never stop somebody's behavior from going forward. Right? So I think I think that's a misnomer. And I think, again, one, it's mixing apples and oranges a little bit. You know, it will and should preclude them them from finding that information to carry out that threat, but it's not going to stop somebody from emoting a threat or sending out [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So can I just ask a quick follow-up that so the threats, the two thousand to three thousand, those are not necessarily going directly to the address of the judges? Where do those threats come from? I guess that that's the [Kim McManus]: They yeah. So thank you. [Robin Morante]: And that's thank you for the the the redirect. So those threats can come in a multitude of ways. Right? They come in through pleadings even. They come in telephone calls to the courthouse. They come in, you know, through social media that that we we monitor. Right? It's they come in in a plethora of ways. They're not all ending up at the the judge's doorstep. I think, for me, the fact that, what I see that that typically, increases the number of threats is, you know, public discord, acrimony in our societal acrimony. Right? When we have that, we see threats increase exponentially. [Angela Arsenault]: So so would it be right to assume that the two thousand you were talking about before Daniel's law weren't directly at judges or or or protected people that they could have been retweets and that type of thing also? [Robin Morante]: They though my reports come in, and those reports are they could be generic threats. They can be bomb threats. They can be, you know, threats against judges. They could be threats against staff. They could be somebody acting out at a service window where, you know, they they needed law enforcement intervention. They can encompass a lot of things. The reason that we have that reporting system, though, is because when somebody is is problematic in that in the court system, it's not you can see their escalation or their decompensation as the case may be. And that intelligence helps us to hopefully prevent through a prediction or a risk assessment what that individual may or may not be capable of. [Angela Arsenault]: Sure. And and I appreciate that. I I I don't even know if you have the information that I'm I'm gonna ask you for, but I would I would love to see the the direct threats that this that Daniel's law [Robin Morante]: I I can [Angela Arsenault]: the the direct threats that potentially that we're going to cover and what the number was before Daniel's law and what the number is now because that that would tell me if it's working. [Robin Morante]: I I I understand. I and, certainly, I can get I can ask the administrative director whether or not those statistics are shareable with with the state of Vermont, but I don't know if that is going to tell you if it's working. I don't know that it's going to I think that that there seems to be a a belief where Daniel's law is supposed to prevent [Thomas Burditt]: threats. Well, if my [Angela Arsenault]: if my information is no longer available, people getting ahold of me. So that that would tell me [Robin Morante]: But they but they know that you're a judge. So they know where the courthouse is. Ultimate, you [Chair Martin LaLonde]: just saying, like, so But [Angela Arsenault]: Daniel's law doesn't cover the courthouse. It it covers your personal information. [Robin Morante]: I understand. But our our our reporting system captures all of it. Is my Oh, [Angela Arsenault]: and I totally understand that, but I but I I I to me, I don't I don't need or want all, but I want the part that would be specific to [Kim McManus]: the law. Know that we could break down. Yeah. Yeah. I don't I don't know [Angela Arsenault]: that make sense to me. [Robin Morante]: Well, I don't know that we could break it down into those actors that arrived at judges' homes or sent things to judges' homes. I don't think that's not typically a breakdown that we would do. [Angela Arsenault]: I find that interesting because that's what the [Speaker 6 ]: law is supposed to cover. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: So I guess I would just ask a follow-up question then to Zach. I how what [Tom Oliver]: are the metrics or what are [Chair Martin LaLonde]: you looking at to see how the law is working or not? [Robin Morante]: I those statistics, I think, would probably come from the office of information privacy. And, certainly, if you are interested in getting those, I can put you in touch with the director over there at the executive branch. But I I I think what the only thing they're gonna be able to offer you is whether or not what maybe what percentage of New Jersey protected parties are participating in that program. It it's your I feel you're trying to, like, prove a a negative. It's it's I think it's a difficult question. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: K. I understand. I see that John Muffler came on if you wanted to comment on that. [John Muffler]: No. I was just gonna she I was re I was saying at the same time when she was saying it. You can't you can't prove a negative, and I get where you're where you're going. Oftentimes, at headquarters in the marshal service, you know, we would get questions like, well, how why do we need so many extra deputies? You know? Can you prove, like, that their their presence is, you know, you know, creating less threats to the judges and, you know, it's one of those things that's difficult very difficult to prove that negative. You know? So I understand the spirit of where you're going with that, but nothing's gonna stop somebody from actually emoting a threat in some way. You know? It so [Speaker 6 ]: I'm confused. [Angela Arsenault]: I I guess I would like to see in in in our bill the information that I'm talking about in a year or two years or three years if it's actually working. Not not necessarily in spirit, I I I agree with the law, but it has been implemented for I think Yeah. I have does Is [Robin Morante]: is this snow I'm sorry. Does the state of Vermont have centralized reporting where you guys are tracking all all of those threats that are any threat or inappropriate communication that comes in? [Angela Arsenault]: Well, we're somebody was talking about two hundred and fifty threats to judges. [Ian Goodnow]: Okay. [Angela Arsenault]: Or two hundred and fifty threats and half were to judges, so there is some information being tracked. [Robin Morante]: So so I guess I would start with examining those and seeing how many of those threats that came into judges have a nexus to their PII, their personal information, and then saying, okay, so if if it did, then the, you you know, the breakdown, then you find out if the the juices is worth the squeeze. How many people, you know because I understand that that, again, all every security step somebody takes is gonna have, as I said, either a cost or or an inconvenience or something. That's how security works. Right? You get into you know, you go through a magnetometer. You gotta take off your belt and do the thing, and you're delayed and all that. That's an inconvenience, but it's a security step. So, you know, the state of Vermont in contemplating what they wanna do with regard to preserving PII for your protected individuals, you know, when it comes to judges, you look at, okay. Here's here's the threats that we have statewide. How many of these threats, if you have, you know, specific reporting with with accurate narratives, how many of them have an access or reference the judge's spouse or where they live, or did they call them at home, or was there a text message, or did they track them online, or what any nexus to something that occurs outside the courthouse. That's how you see, you know, how big of a problem do we have. I will tell you, I think that in the in the age of the Internet and given, you know, what I see here, I would suggest that even without reviewing those, I think you're gonna find a significant amount, have some nexus to what would likely come from Internet research. [Zachary Harvey]: Appreciate that. Thank you. That's it. Thank you. I think and, Robin, I appreciate the testimony. I think, you know, going off the vice chair's point in what I think what I know he's getting at is for a bill that seems so integral to, you know, to this to solve the the problem to protect these covered individuals, it does strike many of us as strange that there's no KPIs measuring that, whether that's data being taken down, whether that's a decrease in cases, you know, whatever it might be. I just it seems strange that KPIs aren't readily available. And maybe the those lie in the Office of Information Privacy. However, it seems like that office has been impacted heavily by private entities that are that are handling a lot of these cases, which brings me to my question. Is following the passage of Daniel's law, there was an article that came out in twenty twenty four citing a hundred and thirty lawsuits that were filed, by Atlas, data privacy. And I'm just kinda curious. Are you tracking the number of law suits that are derived from Daniel's Law? [Robin Morante]: No. So because Alice is a private company. The judiciary you know, if if a judge wants to supplement the Daniel's Law portal with the removal from governmental sites with a private company, they do they will do that. The judiciary, we don't that's not something that we track or that we have access to. We don't have a part I my office does not have a partnership with those private companies, and judges can contact with any number of those private companies if they so choose. I know that Atlas, based upon anecdotal information, I know that the I think it's the PBA have a have a a some sort of plan with them. But, again, you know, some some folks sign up, some don't. Some it it looks different for everyone. So it it would be very difficult to track that. But, certainly, again, I can put your body in touch with Christine Campbell at the Office of Information Privacy. She may have some sort of data that we do not. [Zachary Harvey]: Do you have any indication? And maybe this maybe this is the same answer. So so stop me if it is. But you have any sense of what the number of the dollar amount of settlements that has been derived from these [Ian Goodnow]: No. I do not do. [Tom Oliver]: So that [Zachary Harvey]: would be their office. And so my last question, and, again, maybe this is the same office, but do you have any evidence at this point that individuals are being solicited to sign on to some of these cases? Because anecdotally, I'll tell you what I've heard. I've heard that people are being solicited to join these massive class action lawsuits. And the data rows are being multiplied from thousands to tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands to, in some cases, millions of, data files that are being leaked. And so all of a sudden, you start seeing that compounding, the multiple compounding multiples of the the ten day fine and going out now now, and then, obviously, you have this, you know, huge legal course of action. That's what I'm hearing anecdotally, but I'm curious if you're also hearing that in New Jersey. [Robin Morante]: I have I have heard that. Do I anything other than an anecdote? No. I I don't have any direct knowledge of that. [Zachary Harvey]: But you've heard it anecdotally, but not direct evidence. Okay. That's helpful. Thank you. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Matt Atkinson presumably know that? [Kim McManus]: Yes. [Angela Arsenault]: But I'm also curious [Zachary Harvey]: in terms of the judiciary because they're the ones interacting with us. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Right. Right. But I'll just say [Zachary Harvey]: And like she said, Matt is a private entity, you know, so he really isn't gonna have the information that we want. He's gonna be the what he's Right. That's my whole point is that I think it's gonna be the office of information privacy, which has come up multiple times at this point. Thank you, Robin. I appreciate it. Welcome. [Robin Morante]: And if you guys want that information, I can send it over through Nate, if you'd like. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. That that would be very helpful. I appreciate that. [Kim McManus]: Okay. I'll certainly do that. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: I think we're about to lose our quorum because of other meetings that are about to happen. So I've I've really appreciate your testimony. And if you could get us that information, I'd greatly we'd all greatly appreciate it. So [Robin Morante]: My pleasure. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Yeah. Thank you for your time, and thank you for being available today. [Tom Oliver]: Thank you. [Chair Martin LaLonde]: Thank you, Tom. [John Muffler]: Good luck.

Play Clip Play Full Video Pause

SmartTranscript of House Judiciary - 2025-03-11 - 3:00 PM

This is useful for seeing what happened at the meeting without wading through the whole transcript: